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HEGELIAN INQUIRING SYSTEM 
. 
1. Objectivity 
Objectivity i s  the hallmark of a11 excellent inquiry, and yet i t s  
meaning remains elusive.  
no one i s  obliged f o r  "external" reasons t o  accept the findings; t h a t  each 
inquirer may learn  how any other inquirer conducted i t s  objective inquiry, 
and each inquirer i s  free t o  test  the methods used when they are objective 
and thus confirm or refute  the resul ts .  Thus a necessary condition f o r  
ob jec t iv i ty  i s  tha t  the behavior of an inquirer be itself subject t o  being 
observed. But what does t h i s  requirement that  one inquiring system be ob- 
servable by another r ea l ly  mean, and how does the inquirer acquire objec- 
t i v i t y  from t h i s  process? 
The objec t iv i ty  of a r e s u l t  seems t o  imply t h a t  
A t  the outset  we should note t h a t  "objectivity" i s  closely re la ted  
t o  "object" i n  meaning as w e l l  as i n  sound. 
t h a t  ob jec t iv i ty  occurs when experience i s  shaped i n t o  a "general object"-- 
i . e . ,  gains i t s  form and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  from space, t i m e  and the categories. 
But even t h i s  shaping of experience i s  not enough, as the discussion of t h e  
l as t  chapter shows. We a l so  need t o  design in to  the inquirer an a b i l i t y  t o  
see the "same" object from di f fe ren t  points of view. In a sense, we m a d e  a 
beginning of sa t i s fy ing  t h i s  design requirement i n  the last  chapter as we 
explored d i f f e ren t  modes of representation. 
addi t iona l  idea of an "object" as a col lect ion of interconnected observations. 
Kant seemed t o  have thought 
But now we need t o  develop the  
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i n  which each observer can examine how another observer views the  world. 
The "objectivity" of experience i s  t o  be based on some kind of intercon- 
nec ti on of ob servers. 
Now it i s  almost obvious t h a t  many "points of view" are  required 
What i s  not so t o  create  an "object" l ike  an elephant o r  a university.  
obvious i s  t h a t  many "points of view" are a l so  required t o  produce the ob- 
Jec t iv i ty  of a property, l i k e  "green" o r  "straight. '' 
a l l  tha t  i s  needed t o  a t t a i n  the object ivi ty  of a simple property i s  a 
strong agreement i n  the  Lockean community. 
there i s  no control on the agreement, the so-called object ivi ty  of the  
property becomes no more than a convention, that-- in  the case of computers-- 
can be changed a t  w i l l  by changing the program. 
dog who can monitor t h i s  sor t  of thing, and decide whether the community 
i s  conventional or  not. A "watchdog" watches; i . e . ,  the observers need 
t o  be observed i n  order t o  gain object ivi ty  even f o r  simple properties. 
In other words, no observation can become obJective unless the observer 
i s  a l so  observed objectively. 
2. To be a mind i s  t o  be observed. 
For Lockean inqliirers, 
And yet ,  as we have seen, i f  
We seem t o  need a watch- 
If we apply Berkeley's dictum that  an object gains i t s  object ivi ty  
only by v i r tue  of i t s  being observed t o  the property of being an observer, 
it must mean t h a t  something can only be said t o  observe by vir tue of i t s  
being "observed t o  observe. 
It must be admitted t h a t  t h i s  rather obvious point about inquiring 
Designers wish t o  create computers t o  "solve systems i s  of ten neglected. 
problems, I' "observe pat terns ,  I' and so on. 
a t t a i n s  i n  any of these directions becomes objectively va l id  only because 
the designers observe t h a t  the computers are functioning i n  a cer ta in  manner. 
But  whatever a b i l i t y  the computer 
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To understand what the computer i s  doing objectively,  it i s  e s sen t i a l  t o  
know what the designer i s  doing. The "fact" t h a t  computers "solve problems" 
i s  as much a description of t h e  behavior of the  designer as it i s  a descrip- 
t i on  of the output of the  computer program. 
What would a philosophically as tu te  empiricist  have t o  say about 
t h i s  need f o r  an observer-of-the-observer? One answer seems almost obvious 
and i n  e f f ec t  became the cornerstone of a par t icu lar  type of philosophical 
system developed i n  England. 
radical ly  d i f fe ren t  ways in which t h e  observer may be observed: 
The answer says t h a t  there are actual ly  two 
(1) he 
may observe himself d i rec t ly ,  o r  (2) he may be observed " inferent ia l ly"  by 
another observer. These two ways of observing are taken t o  be rad ica l ly  
different because i n  the first case the self-observer i s  assumed t o  be 
almost completely accurate about what he observes, while i n  the second case 
the "other" observer can only infer  what i s  actual ly  being observed "inside" 
the mind. "Another" observer can only observe what occurs "on the  surface" 
or  a t  the interface of the two inquirers,  whereas the same inquirer can 
observe i t s  own inner states direct ly .  
I said tha t  t h i s  answer t o  the meaning of the observer-of-the- 
observer i s  obvious, but it remains t o  be seen whether it i s  r e a l l y  a satis- 
fac tory  design principle.  Indeed, from the design point of view it already 
seems t o  involve some weaknesses--e.g., the awkward d i s t inc t ion  between 
"inside" and floutside" or  between "samer' and "another" which are surely 
very d i f f i c u l t  t o  define and apparently serve no very good purpose. Yet 
there  i s  something very compelling about the  thes i s  t h a t  each of us has h i s  
p r iva t e  thoughts, sensations and feelings.  
c 4 
3. "he self-knowing self: the subject ivi ty  syndrome. 
Bri t ish empiricism cer ta inly seems t o  have retained throughout i t s  
long his tory the notion tha t  immediate sense data and the inner pictures  
and images of the mind are the special property of the self, and knowable 
only by the self. This has given rise t o  what might be cal led the  
"subjectivity syndrome" of a cer ta in  popular type of philosophy both i n  
the United States and i n  Great Britain. 
"I and I alone can know the inner states of my own mind and can only infer 
the s t a t e s  of other minds." Accompanying t h i s  asser t ion are a number of 
coro l la r ies ,  e.g. ,  "I can never be aware of someone else's toothache" or  
"I can never be sure t h a t  someone sees the color green as I do." 
also some f a i r l y  serious philosophical doctrines connected with t h i s  
philosophy, such as solipsism and the i n a b i l i t y  t o  compare u t i l i t i e s ,  which 
have flavored the in t e l l ec tua l  l i f e  of a number of soc ia l  science disci-  
plines.  A l l  of these doctrines imply tha t ,  because I, and I alone, know 
the inner states of my own mind, no one else can possibly supply any better 
evidence about my own inner s ta tes  than I can; a t  best other people can 
only  infer the propert ies  of my inner states by observing my outward be- 
havior. Also since I have no way of developing an inquiring system that  
reaches beyond my own observations, it follows t h a t  I have no evidence of 
the independent r e a l i t y  of other minds. 
It takes the  form of the asser t ion,  
There are 
According t o  the subject ivis ts ,  since I and I alone know exactly 
what a toothache feels l i k e  t o  me and I have no way of comparing the 
sensations tha t  other people have except i n  terms of the grimaces and other 
signs of distress which they show and which are  a l ike  t o  mine, t o  infer 
from these observations of outward behavior the existence of a l ike pain 
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t o  mine would be t o  go far beyond what t h e  evidence i tself  supplies. 
would permit the generalizing component of the  inquiring system t o  make a 
leap i n  the dark on the bas is  of one instance alone, namely nly own sensa- 
t ions.  
It 
Subjectivism i s  a very weak philosophy w i t h  very strong implications. 
Toothaches may be matters of minor concern i n  the t o t a l  his tory of humanity, 
but one important implication of the subject ivis t  doctrine i s  tha t  it i s  
impossible t o  compare the  values of two or more members of a society other 
than i n  terms of t he i r  simple preference ordering. 
economists t h a t  the intercomparison of preferences must be excluded t h a t  
there occurred i n  economic literature a number of serious attempts t o  
provide a basis of social  choice which i s  free of the need t o  compare the 
preferences of two separate individuals, except i n  an ordinal sense. Thus 
an observer can look a t  a person and see tha t  he chooses X ra ther  than Y. 
Such behavior occurs a t  the  interface of the observer and t h e  observed 
person. But, according t o  subjectivism, he cannot observe how the person 
f e l t  "inside" when he made the choice; specif ical ly ,  he cannot observe 
the  in tens i ty  of the person's preference, although the person c lear ly  does 
have an inner feel ing and i s  aware of it himself. 
erence i s  taken t o  be a subjective evaluation which cannot be communicated 
t o  another. 
So convinced were 
The in tens i ty  of pref- 
The economist's reluctance t o  assume cardinal u t i l i t i e s  and r icher  
forms of measuring human values has had i t s  influence on the  en t i r e  theory 
of optimization i n  system design, especially when the "system" involves 
human beings. 
which i s  often a very unsatisfactory c r i te r ion  i n  the design process. 
For some, the only legitimate "optimal" i s  a "Pareto optimal," 
c 6 
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Now a l l  sciences recognize d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  the  design of ca l ibra t ion  
i n  measurement, ca l ibra t ion  being basical ly  t h e  method of communicating a 
method of measuring. Calibration i s  never perfect ,  so t h a t  e r ro r s  inevi- 
tably occur. I n  length measures, for  example, one must t r y  t o  relate 
a method tha t  uses a yardstick t o  a method t h a t  uses a micrometer: neverthe- 
less, the comparisons of un i t s  are m a d e  with "reasonable success." What i s  
it, therefore,  t h a t  prevents a l i k e  comparison of units i n  human value 
measurements? The answer i s  t h a t  the "real" uni t  i s  encased i n  the individual 
person, and there i s  no way of laying one person's un i t  "alongside" another 's;  
i n  other words, t he  "fundamental" mode of "direct" comparison of un i t s  i s  
supposed t o  be ruled out i n  value measurements. 
4. "Direct" vs. " inferent ia l"  observation. 
A l l  these versions of solipsism and subject ivi ty  arise from the 
assumption t h a t  the  observer must play a peculiar and separate ro l e  i n  in- 
quiry. I n  order t o  be sure t h a t  the observer i s  safeguarded, so t o  speak, 
one designs a l l  inquiry as an emanation from a cent ra l  and ef fec t ive ly  un- 
analyzable set of "direct ,  'I "fundamental" operations of each inquirer.  
The fundamental operations cannot be compared or  observed, because once one 
permits such comparisons, the  authority of the cent ra l  observer disappears 
and one is  apparently l e f t  with no basis f o r  object ivi ty .  
The design pr inciple  of subjectivism has many important consequences, 
a l l  based on "levels" or  "degrees" of knowledge. 
"direct"  knowledge, and the  further one emanates from t h i s  core, the  more 
doubtful are t h e  asser t ions t h e  inquiring system makes. 
i s  no way i n  which the pure empirical inquiring system can seriously consider 
t he  task of predicting future  events. It must simply regard i t s  own data  as 
i t s  sole type of r e a l i t y ,  and when it speaks about the  future  it can only do 
The cent ra l  core a t t a i n s  
For example, there 
I . " so in a kind of poetic fashion. 
The modern subjectivist shies away from concepts of forecasting 
and in general from the whole notion of the redesign of systems in terms 
of their improvement, since the term "improvement" itself implies an 
ability to forecast the future. 
Again, there is the recent distinction which occurs in game theory 
The risky situation is between the concepts of "uncertainty" and "risk." 
taken to be one about which the inquiring system can make probability 
statements which are based on directly observable events. 
situation, on the other hand, arises, say, in a two-person game where the 
actions of the one player depend on his own developed strategies and these 
strategies cannot be predicted from the relative frequency of past plays, 
since they are based in part on the one player's concept of how the other 
player will conduct the game. 
player to obtain evidence about the "inner states," i.e., the strategies 
of the other player. 
An uncertain 
It is said to be impossible for the one 
Subjective empiricism in philosophy, psychology and economics, has 
never undertaken to defend its fundamental doctrine or even to state it 
clearly, perhaps because the doctrine seems so obvious and reasonable. 
phrase that frequently recurs in hcke's Essay, "If one will but look into 
his own mind," is simply reiterated down through the decades as a per- 
fectly satisfactory approach to philosophical reflection and a knowledge 
of one's own mind. 
5 .  
The 
Personal knawledge and community knowledge. 
The doctrine no doubt seems obvious because it is difficult to 
understand haw one inquiring system can be a direct observer of another's 
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in te rna l  states 
t o  es tab l i sh  an 
and processes. For the Lockean community, it i s  enough 
isomorphic agreement, so t h a t  the same inputs are followed 
by the  same verbal expressions and by expressions signifying a common 
agreement; the exact matching of in te rna l  processes i s  not feasible nor 
even essent ia l .  
But the subject ivis t  not only excludes d i r ec t  observation by another 
of the subjects '  state of mind, b u t  a l so  postulates  a maximum accuracy on 
the pa r t  of the  subject with respect t o  i t s  own d i rec t  observations, so t h a t  
when it observes what impression it had as a r e s u l t  of a simple input, the 
answer it gives must be essent ia l ly  correct.  In other words, subjectivism 
introduces the d is t inc t ion  between personal knowledge and community know- 
ledge i n t o  the design of inquirers.  
Community knowledge implies careful  control and scrutiny on the pa r t  
of other inquirers,  personal knowledge does not. 
takes t o  create knowledge f o r  the community, he must write down what he 
intends t o  do, and then, if he i s  a careful s c i en t i s t ,  he must keep a log  
of what he has done, and f i n a l l y  he i s  obliged i n  h i s  reports  so t o  present 
h i s  findings t h a t  any colleague can, if  he wishes, observe exactly what 
the s c i e n t i s t  has been doing. 
i s  a defect  i n  the procedures of the  Lockean inquiring system. 
must be admitted t h a t  science often tends t o  be rather careless  about 
applying these three conditions, nevertheless i n  a l l  cases of dispute the  
Lockean c r i t i c  of a sc i en t i f i c  endeavor has a r igh t  t o  c a l l  f o r  fur ther  and 
deeper explanation of what has been done so t h a t  he can rep l ica te  the work 
of another s c i en t i s t .  Thus the overt behavior of a s c i e n t i s t  must itself 
be subject t o  observation by other s c i e n t i s t s  whenever the purpose i s  t o  
Thus i f  a s c i e n t i s t  under- 
Failure t o  comply with any of these conditions 
While it 
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t o  create community (common) knowledge. 
The basic trouble with subjectivism's d i s t inc t ion  between personal 
and community knowledge i s  tha t  i t s  doctrine of personal knowledge i s  so 
vague t h a t  it leaves no room fo r  an e x p l i c i t  design. 
a t  a l l  c lear  why we should ever t ry  t o  design such a d is t inc t ion  i n t o  the 
inquirer,  except t o  preserve each man's own wish t o  r e t a in  h i s  own subjec- 
t i v e  feel ings as a pa r t  of h i s  world. Thus while we a re  not apt  t o  remove 
bel ief  i n  personal knowledge by any kind of log ica l  argument, the point i s  
t h a t  the manner i n  which the subject ivis t  introduces personal knowledge 
in to  the design of inquiry seems altogether wrong. 
personal knowledge of sensation t h e  s ta tus  of highest  accuracy, and he goes 
on t o  l i nk  t h i s  personal knowledge i n  a very tenuous fashion with community 
knowledge. 
creates  types of behavior tha t  other inquirers can observe and transform 
i n t o  t h e i r  own personal knowledge. 
of design, and al l  the awkwardness can be removed simply by removing the 
need f o r  an "emanation" of knowledge from a cent ra l  core. 
knowledge" of one's own sensation simply means tha t  the inquirer A observes 
itself as an object, i n  exactly t h e  same way t h a t  another inquirer B ob- 
serves A, then all the 'hystery" of i n t e rna l  s t a t e s  disappears. 
design, the designer would not lose control at what i s  surely one of the 
most c r i t i c a l  points i n  the whole ac t iv i ty  of inquiring systems, namely 
a t  the point where information i s  received and interpreted.  If the observer 
can be observed, then he who observes someone "feeling a toothache" can learn  
what i s  being sensed at least as well as the one who #'has the pain." 
human inquirers,  i n  f ac t ,  there seems t o  be ample jus t i f i ca t ion  f o r  asser t ing 
F u r t h e m r e ,  it i s  not 
He wants t o  give 
He thinks t h a t  personal knowledge of one's own sensations 
This seems t o  require a very awkward type 
If "personal 




t h a t  one person may be far more sensit ive t o  another 's  reactions than the 
other i s  t o  himself. 
What would r e s u l t  from giving up the supremacy of privacy i s  a com- 
p l e t e  revision of the r e s t r i c t ions  on empirical inquiry. The so-called 
"basic" or "fundamental" un i t s  and comparisons of the inquirer a re  no longer 
basic o r  fundamental from the point of view of another inquirer;  preferences, 
d i r ec t  sensations and the l i k e  are  the output of a l l  inquirers ,  and have no 
special  epistemological s ta tus .  In Hegel's terms, the "immediacy" of sense 
data becomes a mediating concept of the re f lec t ive  mind. 
Consider, f o r  example, the comparison of personal preferences or 
u t i l i t i e s .  
preferences as he observes them, one would also determine how each person ob- 
serves the preferences of others. If there  i s  a f igh t  over the al locat ion 
of resources, not only  do A and B s t a t e  t h e i r  requirements, but B states 
what A wants and A s t a t e s  what B wants. 
these observations of individual needs. 
6. Representations of observational behavior. 
Instead of merely asking each person i n  a community t o  state h i s  
There i s  no 2 p r i o r i  weighting of 
The design of an inquiring system w e  sha l l  consider i s  based on the  
pr inc ip le  tha t  inquirer A ' s  information about inquirer  B's in te rna l  s t a t e s  
may be as reliable as B ' s  own ref lect ions about h i s  in te rna l  s ta tes .  But 
what does it mean t o  say tha t  one inquirer can observe another's s t a t e s  of 
mind? One answer i s  t o  be found i n  the discussions of the last chapter: 
can extend the Kantian theme of representation t o  the observations of the 
states of mind of an inquirer.  
we 
One mode of representation has already been described: one can ob- 
serve a chemist as he examines various items under the microscope and see 
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that he writes down his results in his log and carries on various other kinds 
of activities. This mode of representing the chemist can be enriched by com- 
paring the activities of two chemists engaged in essentially the same type 
of work. One can make statistical analyses of the results and represent dif- 
ferences in their behavior in terms of their personality types, the labora- 
tory social environment, and whatnot. This way of representing observation 
takes the observers to be psychological individuals, with describable psych- 
nlngical poperties: motivation, sensory response, oral behavior, etc. 
Another way of representing the observer is to consider him as a 
physical entity. The observer is now regarded as a physical input-output 
device, that receives impressions at its surface and transmits these via 
its neural system to some central core, where the "message units" are 
stored and retrieved. Ely this method of describing the sensory organs and 
neural structure of the human observer one can check whether or not certain 
distortions are introduced either by the external instruments or by the 
particular physiological structure of the observer himself. Hence we can 
say that some properties of the stored inputs are products of the instru- 
ments that the scientist uses, or that some properties are the product of 
a particular neurological structure of the observer. We can develop some 
ideas about the relation of inputs to the real objects of the world out- 
side; the nobjectiven inputs are those that are not distorted by the instru- 
ments or internal transmitting processes. 
7.  Objectivity in a physical description of mind. 
Now when the observer represents the inquiring system as a physical 
object responding in a physical manner to physical stimuli, the subjective 
empiricist may feel that the life of the inquirer has been taken away, since 
12 
there i a  no representation of the "inner states," as he feels them t o  ex is t .  
I?everthelese, i f  we accept t h i s  mode of representation f o r  the moment, we can 
see tha t  the design problem of object ivi ty  can be described in a precise 
manner. 
a t ion  i s  "objective." 
(stimulus) and the "inner s ta te"  of the inquirer  as it i s  represented by a 
physical description of the stored inputs of the inquirer.  
server i s  able t o  c l a s s i fy  the stimuli i n t o  ident i f iab le  elements, as w e l l  
as c l a s s i fy  the "inner states" of the inquirer. 
for each stimulus property there corresponds one and only one inner state, 
he could say tha t  the inquirer  i s  responding "objectively. I' 
the inquirer i s  also observed to  output a set of symbols that  are i n  one-to- 
one correspondence with the inner states, then the inquirer i s  reporting i t s  
experiences objectively. 
The problem i s  t o  determine whether an inquirer ' s  account of a s i tu-  
The observer of the inquirer can see both the object 
Suppose the ob- 
If he then observes tha t  
If ,  furthermore, 
This description of object ivi ty  should be compared with the design 
of agreement i n  the Lockean community; in the design of agreement (see 
Appendix of Chapter 4), the  community of inquirers could not observe the 
inner state8 of the other members ,  although in order t o  describe the i r  be- 
havior we did construct their  inner worlds. 
cannot t e l l  whether the set of stimuli are mapped onto the same set of in- 
ternal states i n  each inquirer,  even though we had t o  pul l  ourselves aside 
and do precisely this .  Also the  community nvembers cannot r ea l ly  t e l l  what 
the word "agree" means, except that  it occurs f o r  each inquirer when associ- 
ated i n  a cer ta in  manner w i t h  a stimulus. Finally, each member of the com- 
munity can only know how he reacts, and hence has no objective knowledge of 
a stimulus "outside" h i s  own internal  states of mind. 





But if the adjective "objective" refers to a certain type of exper- 
ience of an observer of the inquirer, then all the mysteries of the subjec- 
tive empiricist vanish. An object is "there" because it is a part of the 
experience of the observer-of-the-inquiring-system and is observed by him 
to have a certain relationship to the internal states of the inquirer. 
the observer, the object is rroutside" the inquirer, and the observer can 
precisely determine whether two inquirers agree. 
whether they see the color green in the same manner. 
Kant's sensuous intuition vanishes: 
construct in Kant's mind as he observed the human inquirer. 
To 
He can even determine 
Thus the mystery of 
it was after all nothing other than a 
Suppose we say, as Hegel did, that the process by which one mind ob- 
serves another is self-reflection (or self-consciousness), recognizing that 
this old-fashioned term is both practical and common in its meaning here. 
Managerid control in a firm is a self-conscious process, as are the controls 
of scientific, traffic, and educational systems. 
In order to keep the characters clear, while not intending to impute 
any specific meaning to their roles, suppose we call the mind that is being 
observed the "subject," and call the other observing mind the "observer." 
The inquiring system we shall examine is the "observer-of-the-subject. 
8. The problem of objectivity in general. 
A number of questions come to mind as soon as we gain the insight 
that objectivity is a property of an observer of a subject, i.e., a property 
of self-reflection. First of all, we see that the "subjective" has not been 
eliminated at all, because in the act of self-reflection the objectivity 
ascribed to the subject becomes itself a subjective state of mind of the ob- 
server. That a subject is having an objective experience is a subjective -
14 
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experience of the observing mind. 
t o t a l  observer-of-a-subject t o  be objective, it must have a component ca- 
pable of receiving inputs about the way i n  which another component receives 
and processes inputs. 
t i v i t y ,  but not a suf f ic ien t  one. The observer of the subject may be 
t o t a l l y  wrong about what it observes o r  reports.  As we sha l l  see, w e  have 
s t i l l  t o  understand how objectivity can be established as  a f a c t  about the 
inquirer.  
A l l  we  have said so far i s  t h a t  f o r  a 
Self-reflection i s  a necessary condition f o r  objec- 
Next, the nature of the "internal s t a t e "  of the subject i s  not clear.  
So far we have represented t h i s  internal  s t a t e  i n  physical terms, a s  though 
the observer, f o r  example, were describing a human subject i n  much the same 
manner as he observes the innards of a computer. 
subjective philosophy i s  t h a t  any such representation of a person's sensa- 
t ions  and feel ings is largely i r re levant  as far as the "actual" in te rna l  
state i s  concerned. 
when he observes the deep green of pine against the intense blue of sky? 
As we have said, t h i s  may be the Kantian question applied t o  the understand- 
ing of a subjective state of mind: 
subject t h a t  make up i t s  r ea l i t y?  One r eca l l s  the story of the blind men 
t ry ing  t o  describe an elephant while each touched some par t  of the body. 
But in the s t o r y  there is a wiser observer-of-the-subject who "sees'' the 
elephant f o r  what it "really" i s  and can therefore laugh a t  the an t ics  of 
the blind. But who sees f o r  the community of inquirers? Who can t e l l  us 
when our modes of representation leave out c ruc ia l  features? 
But the whole point of 
C a n  we represent how a person "actually" f e e l s  or  sees 
what a re  a l l  the representations of the 
This l a s t  design question therefore is t h i s :  under what circum- 
stances does a set of representations of an object capture the essence of 
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the object, i.e., become objective in the most genera2 sense? Perhaps 
subjective philosophy i s  en t i r e ly  too correct :  no thing can ever be ade- 
quately represented by an image of i t s  nature, i n  which case subjective in- 
t e r n a l  states are not d i f fe ren t  from any other states of Nature as  far as 
comprehension of t h e i r  essent ia l  nature i s  concerned. 
9. The mechanist theory of objectivity:  "information. It 
Whenever philosophers f e e l  called upon t o  describe a whole c lass  or 
universe, t h e i r  tendency i s  t o  search f o r  a dichotolqy t h a t  w i l l  serve as a 
beginning f o r  a more elaborate c lassi f icat ion.  This dichotomy should pro- 
duce new ways of looking at  old problems. The dichotomy tha t  seems t o  be 
cal led f o r  here i s  the dichotomy between the mechanical and the teleological-- 
between observations tha t  are  taken t o  be reactions t o  a stimulus or message, 
and observations tha t  are  taken t o  serve some purpose. 
"mechanical" observation i s  alienation: the observed subject i s  opposed 
The essence of 
t o  the  observer. Either the subject i s  passive and the observer active,  or  
else the  observer receives ttin-puts" (and hence i s  passive) while the 
subject creates ''outputst' (and hence i s  active).  The observed and the ob- 
server cannot be the same mind, and must be two opposing aspects of a 
process. 
other  l i v ing  beings) are subjects, or 
The al ienat ion i s  w e l l  known i n  experiments i n  which humans (or 
interviews i n  which the behavior and 
a t t i t u d e s  of people are being studied. 
t h e  observer, and i s  a d i f fe ren t  kind of person from the subjects. 
The experimenter or interviewer i s  
He i s  
supposed t o  have no prejudices, t o  be rat ional ,  t o  be completely honest i n  
h i s  reporting, not t o  care who i s  r ight ,  and so on, while the subjects are 
in te res t ing  only because they have prejudices, a re  i r r a t iona l ,  dishonest, 
self-seeking, e tc .  
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The flavor of the opposition between the observer and the subject 
seems to be well captured by the term ?.lpformBtion." The inquirer is 
"formed" by a certain type of input, much as a computer is formed by a 
program. 
be the set of all reactions of the inquirer to inputs of a certain type. 
Specifically, we imagine an observer-of-the-subject who can identify an in- 
put as an accurate sentence that describes some aspect of the natural world. 
If this sentence is received and stored by the subject, then the subject 
has reliable information. 
say that a "state of the world" is simply a conjunction of sentences about 
the properties of objects in the world. 
question: 
The set is comprised of all sentences that accurately describe the object, 
i.e., all sentences that ascribe all the correct properties to the object. 
10. Information: master and slave. 
Hence the "information" that is stored in an inquirer is taken to 
The mechanist theory of information goes on to 
The mechanist has an answer to the 
what set of representations capture the essence of an object? 
The judge of the accuracy of information is the observer-of-the- 
subject, who in some wsiy holds a dominating role, because the accuracy of 
informstion for the observer is taken to be independent of the wishes or 
purposes of the subject. Information for the mechanist is there and what 
it says cannot be changed by the subject. We determine whether a subject 
is objective by determining whether its stored information corresponds with 
reality; if it does, the information is factual ("objective"). 
factual, it cannot change, no matter how the inquiring mind may change: "a 
fact is a fact" is not a tautology, but rather a statement of an hypothesis 
about the relationship between information and mind. 
If it is 
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According to the mechanist hypothesis, the fact dominates the subject 
simply because he has no choice about the facts. He may wish ever so ar- 
dently that men love their fellow men, but when the facts reveal that men 
hate each other instead, then the inquirer must bow to the authority of fact. 
I n  this mechanist relationship, man becomes the slave of the master who is 
information, or, rather, the slave of the observer-of-the-subject, because 
the "world" of the inquirer is a creation of an observer-of-the-subject. 
is a world that the subject cannot change once the observer has fixed it in 
his mind. More precisely, there is some way of observing-the-subject in 
which the past states of the world of the subject can be accurately ascer- 
tained by the observer, and hence are not changeable by any action on the 
part of the subject. The mechanist hypothesis states that the past as con- 
structed by an "accurate" observer-of-the-subject is inalterable once the 
states of the world are correctly ascertained. 
self and fact; the self is the slave of the master fact created by "another" 
observer. 
It 
Here is true alienation of 
Once the mechanist hypothesis is stated in these terms it appears 
almost absurd. 
authority to "fix" the facts--i.e., to legislate what is information and 
what is not? Such a legislating mind puts each msn in bondage to a rqys- 
terious and unknown master. 
What master observer-of-the-subject can ever gain the 
11. Information: the conquering lord. 
And yet the mechanist hypothesis about the nature of objectivity 
has infiltrated practically every aspect of intellectual and social 
life. Government information agencies consider themselves to be recip- 
ients and storers of various "pieces of information" of interest to the 
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c i t i zen  and t o  those who serve the c i t i zen  i n  military and non-military 
capacit ies.  The information i s  fixed, and cannot, under penalty of the 
l a w ,  be altered. O u r  whole theory of statistics i s  based on the  notion 
t h a t  pieces of information can be numbered and represented symbolically 
(xi, yi, e t c . )  and t h a t  the task of the s t a t i s t i c i a n  i s  one of aggregating 
these "given" b i t s  of information i n  various ways. 
I n  logic,  too, the  mechanist philosophy has had i t s  strong influence. 
The logician i s  primarily interested i n  sentences, and he has come t o  think 
of sentences i n  terms of the i r  semantic content. Any given sentence tha t  i s  
not a tautology may express a fac tua l  description of the world, and it i s  
the task  of the semanticist t o  put the  fac tua l  aspects together i n  a pa t te rn  
t h a t  w i l l  be useful  t o  the reader. 
Finally,  i n  tha t  pa r t  of mathematics cal led "information theory, 
information is reduced t o  common units,  and spec i f ica l ly  i n  the case of 
d i g i t a l  information t o  " b i t s "  of information. 
eyes of many information theor i s t s  i s  t o  extend the concepts developed i n  
information theory r e l a t ing  t o  redundancy, e t c . ,  t o  useful concepts of 
meaningfulness. 
t h a t  many writers speculate on the poss ib i l i t y  of completely describing the 
human brain i n  terms of an information processing device. 
needs t o  be another mind t h a t  can accurately observe what the brain i s  
"real ly"  l i k e  even though proponents of t h i s  physical reductionism do not 
t e l l  us how t h i s  "other m i n d "  can a l s o  be a mechanical information process- 
i ng  device. 
t o  information, there i s  the master observer-of-the-subject who has the 
au thor i ty  t o  f i x  the  unalterable s ta tus  of information i n  various "data 
An important problem i n  the 
So fascinating are the developments of information theory 
To do so, there 
How does it happen t h a t  i n  a l l  these widely accepted approaches 
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banks" of government, industry, etc. ? 
12. The subject as the willing slave. 
Somehow it must be the subject himself who delegates this authority 
to the master observer-of-the-subject, because our tradition states that 
we have freed ourselves from dogma. 
people accept facts, it is not at a l l  apparent what policy decisions are 
being followed. 
But if we examine the reasons why 
For example, we accept information because 
(1) it is provided by ''expertstt (physicists, doctors, engineers, etc. ); 
(2) it is produced by a highly bureaucratized system with "built-in" 
controls (accounting systems, registration systems, etc. ); 
(3 )  it is such that no one feels inclined to disagree (current state 
of the weather, existence of a fire or war, etc.). 
In each of these instances, who is the master observer-of-the-subject? 
Who says that the information of experts should be accepted? Who says that 
bureaucratic information is reliable? Who says that facts that no one dis- 
putes are accurate? The authority of the 
expert arises out of the recognition he has gained from his peers. If you 
want to know whether Jones is an expert, ask Smith, who is also an expert. 
The people, i.e., the llsubjects" in our earlier terminology, decide who these 
guardians of expertness really are. 
system arises out of the acceptance of the system by "auditors." 
to know whether a company has kept its books correctly, ask an auditing firm 
to check on their procedures. 
master observer-of-the-subject seems to be a "collective mind"--a mind that 
is "more than" all the individual subjects and that can pass judgment on 
what each individual says. 
The answers are readily at hand. 
The authority of the bureaucratized 
If you want 
In the last case--universal agreement--the 
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The designer of inquiring systems i s  less interested i n  whether the 
master i s  the expert, the auditor,  o r  the col lect ive mind, than he i s  i n  the 
basic design pr inciple  t h a t  j u s t i f i e s  each of these choices. Why should 
Smith be accepted as an expert on the expert advice of Jones? Why do we 
accept the findings of auditors,  or  l e t  the col lect ive mind dominate our 
notion of what i s  r e a l l y  happening? Perhaps some h i n t  of the answers t o  
these questions can be found by examining a similar l i s t  where the subject 
does not recognize a master: 
(1) i n  moral matters there are no experts; 
(2) i n  accounts of the saving of souls or  the blessings conferred 
by philanthropy or  f e d e r d  aid, there are no auditors; 
(3) on the t rue  causes of w a r  and poverty, there i s  no col lect ive 
agreement. 
It i s  in te res t ing  t o  note tha t  t h i s  second l i s t  seems far more important 
than the f irst .  
what our ultimate values should be. The auditors can guarantee the statement 
of "assets" of a company, but they can t e l l  us nothing about the soc ia l  
value of these assets .  
occurred, but can say nothing about why it occurred. 
13. 
The experts can tell us "facts" but they can ' t  t e l l  us 
The collective mind can agree t h a t  a calamity has  
The subject as a manager. 
This comment on the second l ist  suggests another basis f o r  a policy 
of the subject t h a t  will govern the master observer-of-the-subject: 
of mere blind willingness, the su3ject should delegate authority whenever 
the ne t  benefits  warrant doing so. 
components, the gross benefi t  of the policy and the cost  of carrying out the 
policy. 
instead 
The net benefits  a re  made up of two 
Thus we would a l l  l i k e  t o  check on the advice of an expert, but it 
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would cost  us yeam of education and t ra in ing  t o  do so, and hence the maxi- 
mum net benefi t  accrues *en we t r u s t  the experts. The experts may be wrong 
on occasion, and t h i s  i s  added into the cost  of the policy. Even so, the 
net benefit  may be maximal when we t r u s t  them. But on matters of ultimate 
value, the net benefi ts  are not maximized, because the experts disagree or  
the subject does not know how t o  identify an "expert," and thus the costs  of 
t r u s t  a re  too high. 
the master observer t o  ru le  whenever the net  benefi ts  so decide. 
Such a policy makes the subject a "manager," who permits 
The net benefi t  basis of information policy i s  what I have previously 
cal led the "teleological" approach t o  information, because it emphasizes 
purpose (means and ends). 
a l ienat ion between observer and observed. 
bl indly wil l ing t o  accept the fac ts  about the world because of the d i c t a  of 
The te leological  approach appears t o  reduce the 
If the subject i s  forced or 
an observer-of-the-subject, the alienation i s  severe. 
subject after a l l  who uses teleological considerations t o  appoint the master 
observer-of-the-subject, then the al ienat ion seems t o  disappear. The l t facts t t  
are, after a l l ,  the creations of the subject ' s  own policy making. Thus when 
a simple sentence of the form, "this i s  green" i s  stated,  one subject may 
respond, "is it indeed?" and t h e  other may respond, "so what?" The "is it 
indeed?" response i s  the response of a blindly wil l ing and alienated subject. 
Such an inquirer receives the offered piece of information and stores  it as 
a piece of information i n  the msa ic  of b i t s  of information i n  i t s  memory. 
It accepts the l eg i s l a t ion  of 8 master observer. 
sponse, "so what?" a l b e i t  rude, seems t o  be a freeing response. 
subject  is i n  no mood t o  receive unless the offered piece of information can 
be perceived as useful i n  some plan of i t s  operation. 
But i f  it i s  the 
On the other hand, the re- 
Here the 
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14. The paradox of te leological  information. 
But it must be apparent that  the te leological  basis of information 
policy u t t e r l y  fa i ls  t o  solve the problem of authority,  nor does it rea l ly  
remove the al ienat ion of subject and observer-of-the-subject. All it does 
i s  t o  suggest a new question: what a r e  the costs  and benefi ts  of t rus t ing  
the mster? Who establ ishes  the evidence, pro and con, f o r  answering t h i s  
que st ion? 
But how d i f f i c u l t  a question i s  it? Are the f a c t s  f a i r l y  obvious, so 
t h a t  the col lect ive mind of agreement could be created t o  solve them? Con- 
sider  a ra ther  simple item of information, e.g., information about a cons- 
t r a i n t  on the behavior of the receiver. 
the form, "There i s  a log across the road i n  f ront  of US." I f  the subject 
i s  i n  the mood of "so what?" he may very well drive on ahead and pass over 
the ro t ten  log  without interruption of h i s  normal course of action. 
t h i s  case the offered information i s  of no value whatsoever; indeed it does 
not even stand as a "fact" i n  the receiver 's  world. I n  other words, i n  the 
case of the "so what?" attitude, something becomes information only because 
i t  can f ind a j u s t i f i ab le  place i n  the t o t a l  scheme of the subject ' s  ac t i -  
v i t i e s ,  i n  such a m y  that i t s  posit ion i n  the t o t a l  scheme of things, as 
W i l l i a m  James puts it, "makes a difference" i n  what the subject cctual ly  
does. 
simple cases i s  not a very obvious one a t  a l l .  
For example, the information i s  i n  
In 
It begins t o  look as though the question of net benefi t  even i n  
In order t o  explore the net benefi t  policy of information more pre- 
c i se ly ,  we can use a technical i l l u s t r a t ion ,  the control of inventories where 
the ne t  benefi t  of information can be expressed i n  quantitative terms. 
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I 
An inventory system i s  simply a system which s tores  items tha t  have 
The reason fo r  manufacturing and s tor ing use a t  various points of t i m e .  
the items ahead of time l ies  i n  the extreme inconvenience t h a t  may OCCUT i n  
t rying t o  create  an i t e m  a t  exactly the point where the need ar ises .  
i s  a familiar enough s i tua t ion  t o  any householder who habitually s tores  
various sor t s  of canned goods, sugar, salt and the l i k e ,  thereby incurring 
an expenditure ahead of the actual occasion of the need simply t o  avoid the 
enormous inconvenience of obtaining the items from the s tore  a t  exactly 
the times when they are  needed. 
This 
Now what i s  the relevant information t h a t  anyone who tries t o  s e t  
up an  inventory should have? WeU, first of all, he should have so- e s t i -  
mate of the inconvenience tha t  may be incurred when items from inventory are  
demanded and are not available. 
portance of s tor ing various types of material i n  h i s  inventory. 
it would cer tainly be worthwhile i f  the  person controll ing the inventory 
had some knowledge of when the needs were ap t  t o  ar ise .  
him t o  plan h i s  inventory storage pol ic ies  over t i m e  i n  accordance with 
these needs. Finally the controller of inventory should have information 
about the costs  of holding items in inventory over long periods of time. 
For example, he may find tha t  cer ta in  i t e m s  deter iorate ,  or t ha t  the pur- 
chase of an i t e m  ahead of time prevents h i s  making use of a more up-to-date 
i t e m  when the need r e a l l y  occurs. 
up in inventory and i s  not available f o r  other opportunities when they 
occur. 
i n g  items i n  inventory by government taxation pol ic ies .  
This w i l l  guide him i n  the r e l a t ive  i m -  
Secondly, 
This would enable 
H e  may also find tha t  h i s  cap i t a l  i s  tied 
In cer ta in  countries he w i l l  a l so  incur penal t ies  imposed f o r  hold- 
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There may be other types of information important t o  the holder of 
H e  may wish t o  determine, f o r  example, how long it takes t o  inventories. 
receive an i t e m  i n to  inventory once an order ha6 been placed, and he may 
want t o  have some general information about the qua l i ty  of the items i n  in- 
ventory and whether they r e a l l y  meet the  requirements of the items when the 
needs occur. 
mentary aspects mentioned above, namely, the cost  of placing items in inven- 
tory,  the demand f o r  i t e m s  from inventory, and the cost  of holding an i t e m  
i n  inventory over a period of time. 
log ica l  information. 
Suppose, however, we r e s t r i c t  ourselves t o  the three ele- 
All of these are examples of teleo- 
From the point of view of an inquiring system the problem now i s  t o  
determine these ''basict1 pieces of information. 
empir ic is t  approach t o  the problem, we would ask ourselves what we must 
observe in order t o  a r r ive  a t  suitable information concerning the three 
basic  questions. What, f o r  example, sha l l  we observe when we are asked, 
'mat does it cost t o  order and place an i t e m  i n  inventory?" 
If we were t o  adopt a purely 
The natural  react ion t o  t h i s  question would be t o  say tha t  one should 
look at the pas t  h i s tory  of the inventory system. 
cost  in the  past  t o  place an order and receive an i t e m  i n t o  inventory? 
m i & t  therefore examine the  a c t i v i t i e s  of the people who place the order 
and begin t o  add up the cost  components i n  terms of labor and materials re- 
quired t o  i n i t i a t e  the order and t o  process it. 
could t o  develop a careful  description of the exact way i n  which orders are 
placed and the kinds of controls t h a t  are imposed, and would t r y  then t o  
relate these t o  ac tua l  cost  output on the  pa r t  of the  e n t i r e  system. In 
t h i s  regard, the inquiring system would adopt an "is it indeed?" or  passive 
What, i n  fact, ha5 it -
We 
We would do the best we 
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ro l e  i n  i t s  opposition t o  nature. 
of asser t ions about how orders have been placed as determined by an expert 
master observer. 
A s t a t e  of nature would be a conjunction 
I n  the  same manner, i f  we were t o  tackle the problem of requirements 
from the demand point of view, we would t r y  t o  search through pas t  records 
t o  determine a t  what par t icu lar  points of time requests f o r  i t e m s  had been 
made, i n  what form they had come, and how large the quant i t ies  were, and so 
on. 
inquirer,  who receives what i s  given--i.e., the data, i n  a passive mode. 
The "objective'' demand on inventory i s  something t h a t  i s  to ld  t o  the 
Finally,  turning t o  the question of the cost  of holding items i n  in- 
ventory, we might conduct a careful search of past  records t h a t  give evi-  
dence concerning obsolescence, deterioration, taxation, and the l ike.  To 
estimate the cost  of cap i t a l  tied up i n  inventory, we would t r y  t o  estimate 
the extent of demand the inventory system places on t he  available capi ta l  
of the corporation o r  agency; we would then t r y  t o  estimate the ac tua l  " lost  
opportunity" cost  of t h i s  t ie-up of cap i ta l .  
This "is it indeed?" approach t o  the inventory problem i s  the one 
most often followed by operations researchers and others  who t r y  t o  assist 
management i n  the control of inventories, but from the point of view of the 
designer, the whole procedure seems very weak. For example, the par t icu lar  
inventory system may rely on a cer ta in  resource t o  supply items of inventory 
t o  it. 
provided and tha t  the inventory system must pay a ce r t a in  penalty each time 
an emergency order i s  placed, and so on. It would natural ly  occur t o  the 
designer of the inventory system t o  ask whether or  not the "given" source 
f o r  the inventory i s  appropriate. Perhaps if the inventory system itself  
This resource nysy require t h a t  a cer ta in  number of days notice be 
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could control i t s  own source, a number of the penal t ies  associated with re- 
placing items i n  inventory would not occur, and a t  least the t o t a l  cost  of 
placing regular orders and emergency orders could be vast ly  reduced. 
If t h i s  were the case, it would be simply incorrect t o  say t h a t  the 
relevant information about the  cost of ordering and placing items i n  inven- 
tory i s  t o  be found i n  the  practices of the ex is t ing  resource agency. 
one who confined h i s  a t ten t ion  t o  t h i s  kind of information would simply f a i l  
t o  acquire information, whatever "data" he found. 
Any- 
In other words, i f  the asser t ion about the cost  of placing orders i s  
i n  the form "The cost  has been k d o l l a r s  per order," the asser t ion i s  not 
ye t  information; i t s  opposition t o  the purposive inquirer i s  quite d i f fe ren t  
from i t s  opposition t o  the mechanical inquirer.  In the case of the mechan- 
i c a l  inquirer ,  the information w i l l  be received i f  it i s  properly authorized; 
i n  the case of the te leological  inquirer,  it w i l l  be used i f  it f i t s  i n t o  a 
t o t a l  plan of action. 
O r ,  again, i n  the case of the demand f o r  items from inventory, the 
designer may f ind  t h a t  the person asking f o r  items from inventory does so 
according t o  a cer ta in  convenient pa t te rn  from h i s  point of view, but  has 
no real need f o r  the i t e m  when the requests are made. 
f a c t  discover t h a t  i f  the persons making the requests a re  rewarded i n  cer ta in  
The designer may i n  
ways, they can smooth out t h e i r  requirement schedule so as t o  avoid almost 
all of the  emergency s i tua t ions  t h a t  have occurred i n  the past. 
Finally, when w e  consider the problem of holding items i n  inventory, 
we may discover t h a t  i n  the  pas t  the organization has often failed t o  take 
advantage of opportunities t o  use c a p i t a l  most profitably.  In t h i s  case, 
descr ipt ive sentences about past  opportunity pol ic ies  would not 
const i tute  information about the cost of tied-up cap i t a l  i n  view of the f a c t  
t h a t  were these pol ic ies  improved, the ac tua l  cos ts  of tying up cap i t a l  i n  
inventory might be considerably greater than one would estimate from a de- 
scr ipt ion of past  behavior. 
AU. t h i s  amounts t o  saying tha t  the inventory system i s  embedded i n  a 
much la rger  system. The theme, of course, i s  merely an application of the 
theory of systems developed i n  Chapter 111. An inventory system i s  a non- 
separable pa r t  of the rest of the system, and "information" about the  charac- 
t e r i s t i c s  of the inventory system from the te leological  point of view depends 
upon the way i n  which the t o t a l  system i s  viewed. 
placing an i t e m  i n  inventory i s  not an i so la ted  "piece" of information; a 
cost-datum contains within it a picture of what the en t i r e  system i s  l i k e ,  
j u s t  as do the requirement schedule and the cos ts  of holding the i t e m s  i n  
inventory. 
quirements of an inventory system are. 
t o t a l  picture  of the en t i r e  system i n  which the inventory system i s  em- 
bedded. Each cost  f ac to r  i n  e f fec t  i s  a mirror of the  e n t i r e  system: it 
r e f l e c t s  the way i n  which the en t i re  system works so as t o  generate a 
ce r t a in  penalty associated with a given type of act ion t h a t  i s  adopted by 
p a r t  of the system. 
The cost  of ordering and 
The inquirer cannot passively observe what the  costs  and re- 
H e  must infer what they are from a 
Thus the sentence "the cost  of doing x i s  k dol lars"  i s  an abbrevia- 
t i o n  of the sentence "the e n t i r e  relevant system has such-and-such propert ies  
among which i s  the cost  of doing x." 
To recapi tulate ,  there  are t w o  rad ica l ly  d i f fe ren t  ways of defining 
"observation. 'I Mechanical observation i s  defined as a "reaction" t o  a 
stimulus: 
B observes t h a t  A i s  "reacting" i n  some manner t o  X. 
an inquiring system A tfobserves" an object X i f  another inquirer  
The reaction may be 
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the flash of a neuron, or the flick of an eye, or a spoken word, or a 
string of symbols. Once the observer-of-the-subject observes the completed 
process of stimulus and response, then for him the subject has "observed." 
To know that a subject has observed "objectively," we need the authority of 
a master observer-of-the-subject. Teleological observation, on the other 
hand, is a way of observing the world so that the resulting information is 
useful to a purposive being. To know that a subject has observed ''objec- 
tively" we need to know the total system in which the subject acts. We can 
justify the appointment of the master observer-of-the-subject by means of a 
teleological argument--i.e., the master is the appointed servant of the 
teleological subject. But this justification simply complicates the rela- 
tionship, because the subject cannot decide without teleological informa- 
tion? and yet he cannot acquire objective teleological information without 
knowing the whole system. 
15. The search for objectivity: infinite regress or vicious circle? 
The pathway to objectivity seems to be either an infinite regress 
or a vicious circle. It would be an infinite regress if the designer were 
always to evoke a new master observer to legislate over the old master and 
his subject. ("Jones is an expert because Smith says he is, and Smith is an 
expert on Jones' expertness because Brown says he is and . . . I t ) .  It would 
be a vicious circle if the designer were to permit the subject to appoint 
the master and the master to appoint the subject ("Jones is an expert be- 
cause Smith says he is, and Smith is an expert because Jones vouches for 
him. ' I ) .  
It is interesting to note that the regress is merely called infinite, 
while the circle is called vicious, even though the circle appears to be the 
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more innocuous of the two. F'rom now on, these two characters will play 
their role in the design of inquiring systems; the problem is either to 
design a regress of inquirers that will somehow collectively approximate 
objectivity, or else to create a circle that is not vicious. In effect, 
the hckean community is an attempt to build a nonvicious circle, because 
each member's objectivity is guaranteed by the agreement of everyone else. 
In political designs, Lockets is a system of "checks and balances," but as 
in the case of the Lockean community, it is not apparent why agreements of 





16. Information and Weltanschauungen. 
For the present, we turn our attention to the possibility of design- 
ing an infinite regress of inquirers that stands for more than a simple and 
dull "A is right because B says so, B is right because C says so, etc." 
A teleological inquiring system wishes to know whether a piece of 
information is correct. 
image of its world--a Weltanschauung--that provides one picture of the in- 
quirer's alternative actions and hence the relevance of the information and 
the way it should be used. 
X to Y. 
provides the times and costs of each. 
the minimum time and cost conveyance. 
this Weltanschauung, are irrelevant, i.e., no matter how risky the travel, 
the "optimal" conveyance remains the same. Another Weltanschauunq may say 
that the "real" objective of the inquirer is not to travel, but to communi- 
cate with a distant colleague. 
shifts, and the interpretation of the ''data'' of the first Weltanschauung 
In order to decide on this matter, it creates an 
For example, the inquirer wants to travel from 
One Weltanschauung says that there are four means of travel, and 
On this basis, the inquirer selects 
Convenience and safety, according to 
The picture of the set of alternative actions 
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becomes quite d i f fe ren t .  
t un i t i e s  of the inquirer t o  use the t r a v e l  time f o r  other purposes. 
The "costr' of t r a v e l  must now include l o s t  oppor- 
Hence i n  t h e  te leological  theory of information, the sentence, "X i s  
a piece of information" i s  va l id  only when embedded i n  a cer ta in  'weltan- 
schauung," i.e.,  way of viewing the entire system. It follows tha t  an in- 
quirer  a t t a ins  objective information only i f  he chooses the correct Weltan- 
schauung. 
up i n  the air, f o r  where i s  the master observer who can accurately determine 
the charac te r i s t ics  of the relevant world of the  decision maker? 
15.  The Hegelian d ia lec t ic .  
W r t  t h i s  conclusion seems t o  leave the whole problem of design 
The h i s to r i ca l  solution t o  t h i s  question w a s  f i rs t  suggested by Kant 
and later elaborated by the  post-Kantian German philosophers, and especial ly  
Hegel. 
siders some c l a s s i ca l  hypotheses about the or igin of the universe, i t s  
In the Transcendental Dialectic of h i s  f i rs t  Critique, Kant con- 
boundaries, and the  immortality of the soul and i t s  freedom. H e  presents 
side by side two equally compelling arguments each based on a l l  the facts 
and reasons h i s  ingenious m i n d  could find. One argument shows convincingly 
t h a t  the  world could have had no beginning i n  time, while the other shows 
with equal conviction t h a t  it must have had a beginning. In the  same vein, 
one argument ra t iona l ly  proves tha t  the world i s  bounded, and the "anti- 
t h e t i c a l "  argument demonstrates t h a t  it i s  not; the thes i s  proves the i m -  
mortal i ty  of the soul, the antithesis proves the mortality; the thes i s  
proves t h a t  the  w i l l  i s  free, t h e  anti thesis t h a t  it i s  not. The point of 
a l l  these exercises is  t o  es tab l i sh  Kant's grander "synthesis" t h a t  uncon- 
s t ra ined  reason leads t o  contradictory conclusions, because it i s  permitted 
t o  go beyond i t s  proper use a5 a coordinator of sensuous inputs i n t o  the 
I .  inquiring sys tem. 
I n  Hegel the Kantian design i s  made more expl ic i t .  First the in- 
In Hegel's philosophy, quirer  must be endowed with a richness of experience. 
t h i s  meant exposure of the mind t o  a vas t  array of psychic events, i n  l i ter-  
ature, his tory,  philosophy and science. In the more mundane approach t o  the 
design of inquiring systems, the requirement might be interpreted as a 
loading of "information" in t h e  mechanical sense discussed above, where an 
attempt i s  made t o  acquire as broad a sweep of the "data" as possible. The 
same idea i s  familiar of anyone who has t r i e d  t o  study organizations with a 
view t o  improving them; t h e  f i r s t  few months may be spent i n  "looking a t  
and l i s ten ing  to"  as many aspects as possible. 
Next, the inquirer must generate a conviction about some fundamental 
thes i s ;  it must have the capabili ty of believing wholeheartedly that a 
cer ta in  point of view i s  correct. For Hegel, t h i s  conviction must be 
rooted i n  a strong feel ing as well as the kind of log ica l  demonstration 
Kant provides i n  the Transcendental Dialectic. 
t h a t  the inquirer l i ve  i t s  conviction as well as think it because the con- 
It i s  essent ia l  f o r  Hegel 
v ic t ion  fo r  Hegel i s  a stage i n  the psychic development of the inquiring 
mind. 
It goes without saying tha t  t h i s  requirement i s  vague from the 
poin t  of view of a thinking type designer who wants h i s  requirements t o  be 
exp l i c i t .  A formal approximation t o  the "living r ea l i t y"  tha t  Hegel t a lks  
about might be accomplished as  fcllows. 
The designer undertakes t o  construct a "case" f o r  a point of view, i n  
e f f e c t  a defense of a thes i s  "A". 
Weltanschauung i n  such a way tha t  the wealth of "information" i n  the in- 
qu i r e r ' s  data bank i s  interpreted by means of the Weltanschauung t o  support 
The design of the case f o r  A constructs a 
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thesis A over a l l  other poss ib i l i t i es .  
What the designer t r i e s  t o  do i s  t o  reverse the usual design pro- 
cedure of data-to-model-to-optimal. 
of a policy a6 a "datum" and then constructs a view of the world i n  which 
cer ta in  data  become relevant (information), other data become irrelevant  
(non-information) and the world view maximally supports policy A. 
words, he proceeds from optimal t o  model t o  data. 
design procedure can be sketched as follows. 
Instead, he starts with the optimality 
I n  other 
The formalization of t h i s  
The inquirer has a data bank 
of elements, dl, d2 ... dn . The elements of the data bank are  symbols of 
various kinds. They may be numbers, graphs, mathematical equations, reports,  
e tc .  
of all the  things tha t  the operations research team has heard about costs,  
products, personnel, p ro f i t s ,  e tc .  
ological s ta tus ,  i.e., it does not say anything about the world. 
I n  the example of the inventory problem, they would be the col lect ion 
No "datum" by i t s e l f  has any epistem- 
The inquiring system also has  a s e t  of formal models which can each 
be interpreted as a description of the "whole system," W1, W2,. . . ,Wn, and 
the interpretat ions of which a re  non-identical. 
a Weltanschauung W 
An i t e m  of information does have epistemological s ta tus ,  i .e.,  i s  teleo- 
log ica l ly  meaningful. I n  other words, an i t e m  of information has the prop- 
e r t y  t h a t  it can be used as  evidence r e l a t ive  t o  a thes i s  A. 
i s  an asser t ion not contained i n  e i ther  the information or the Weltanschauung. 
By "use as evidence" i s  meant tha t  the item of information lends a cer ta in  
posi t ive,  zero, or negative credence t o  the thesis (as opposed t o  an item 
t h a t  i s  couched i n  a symbolism that  has no meaning r e l a t ive  t o  the thes i s ) .  
Any datum di conjoined t o  
implies one or more items of information. 3 
The thes i s  A 
. 
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The formal design of Hegel's " l iving conviction" i s  t o  se lec t  a 
Weltanschauung t h a t  maximizes the credence i n  the thes i s  A, i . e . ,  a Wo which 
when conjoined with each of the elements of the data bank produces an in- 
formation set tha t  maximizes the evidence f o r  A. In plainer  language, the 
inquirer sets about showing tha t  there i s  a way t o  look a t  r e a l i t y  so t h a t  
the data can be interpreted t o  support t h e  thesis. 
In t h i s  account of t h e  Regelian design, it i s  not c lear  where the 
thes i s  comes from. How does a person acquire a conviction, or how does the 
inquiring system se lec t  the thes i s  whose credence i s  t o  be maximized? 
h a v i n g  t h i s  question unanswered f o r  the moment, we introduce the 
next character i n  Hegel's drama. This i s  an observer-of-the-subject, who 
looks on the a c t  of personal conviction "objectively." H e  says, "I see t h a t  
t h i s  mind i s  u t t e r l y  convinced that thes i s  A i s  t rue;  I wonder why?" The 
s p i r i t  of t h i s  observer i s  i n  opposition t o  the subject. 
why?" i s  the "so what?" mentioned ear l ie r .  
I ts  "I wonder 
The opposing mind i s  i n  the mood 
of "I wonder why another conviction wouldn't do ju s t  as well?" 
observe the subject, the other mind conceives another conviction and asks 
what it would be l i k e  t o  be equally convinced of this "anti-thesis." 
i s  the manner i n  which one Hegelian mind observes another: 
In order t o  
Such 
i n  the mood of 
opposition. 
How in Kant's !Cranscendental Dialectic,  the an t i t hes i s  was found i n  a 
I f  the thes i s  i s  ''the world had a beginning straightforward log ica l  manner. 
in time," the an t i t hes i s  i s  "the world had no beginning i n  time." A 
c l a s s i c a l  logician would want t o  say t h a t  e i the r  the thes i s  o r  the an t i -  
t h e s i s  i s  t rue;  Kant argued t h a t  both are  epistemologically unprovable, and 
t h a t  t h e  only "truth" t o  be found i s  t h a t  they both t r y  t o  extend reason 
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beyond its proper domain. In Kegel, on the other hand, the antithesis is 
not the contradictory of the thesis, but rather its deadliest enemy. 
an anti-conviction of forcefulness at least as great as the conviction. 
"deadliest enemy" concept is found most clearly in politics. 
enemy of democracy is not nondemocracy, but a very explicit and detailed 
political design called the Commmist Party. The deadliest enemy of the 





Now the very effort to maintain one's conviction in the thesis 
generates opportunity for the deadliest enemy. The effort to preserve 
democracy leads to wire-tapping and secrecy, in fact to non-democratic 
policies. 
its very conviction w i l l  breed revolution. 
not a dispassionate "other mind"; it is passionately dedicated to destruction 
of the subject's conviction. 
creates a mood of opposition. 
If a nation as a whole is convinced that dictatorship is correct, 
The observer-of-the-subject is 
The very activity of observing the subject 
If we try to design this very living drama of conflict into the in- 
quiring system, it is not clear how we can capture its life. 
more or less dead pan approach to the design of conviction given above, we 
can set down the requirement that the antithesis B be so selected that of 
all alternative counter theses to A, B has maximum credence. This means 
that there exists a Weltanschauung W which when conjoined with the data, 
maximizes the evidence for B and the maximum "score" for B exceeds that 
attained by any other counter thesis and its maximizing W. 
Following the 
Evidently, the meaning of this design conviction (thesis) and counter- 
conviction (antithesis) depends on the set of data, the set of Weltanschaungen, 
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.s 
the meaning of "conjoining data t o  a Weltanschauung, 
credence, a l l  of which are vague a t  t h i s  stage. But the basic design idea 
needs t o  be explored before the formal details can be m a d e  more precise i n  
the next chapter. 
and the measure of 
It w i l l  be noted tha t  i n  the Hegelian design the thes i s  and an t i -  
thesis have the same status .  The ant i thes i s  i s  b u i l t  out of the thesis by 
the building blocks of the data and the Weltanschauungen; but the thes i s  
could j u s t  as eas i ly  have been b u i l t  out of the ant i thesis .  Hence we miss 
t h a t  aspect of the Hegelian picture i n  which the an t i thes i s  looks upon the 
thesis tha t  generated it i n  a way tha t  i s  d i f fe ren t  from the attitude of the 
thesis. The revolutionary looks down upon the reactionary. The reactionary 
i n  h i s  conviction can only think that the revolutionary i s  crazy o r  criminal; 
he must u t t e r l y  r e j e c t  h i m  as an unnatural e v i l  or a meaningless mind. 
the revolutionary understands the nature of the reactionary f u l l  well; f o r  
But 
h i m  the reactionary's conviction i s  based on a natural  selfish greed and 
hypocricy. As a t  other points i n  t h i s  chapter, e.g., personal vs. community 
knowledge, we see that  the design does not seem capable of representing the 
l i v i n g  idea of the philosopher. 
I n  the fourth a c t  of the Hegelian drama another type of observer-of- 
the-subject enters ,  who observes not the conviction but the opposition. He 
i s  a qui te  d i f f e ren t  observer-of-the-subject, because he tr ies t o  see how 
the opposition arises out of the par t icular  kinds of minds that clash i n  
their  convictions. 
finds i n  labor and internat ional  disputes. 
But he i s  no compromiser of the bargaining so r t  t h a t  one 
He i s  a l so  i n  opposition, an 
opposition t o  the very nature of the conf l ic t ,  and he does not seek t o  deal 
out rewards tha t  w i l l  keep all par t ies  reasonably content. Instead, he 
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builds a new world view i n  which the nature of the confl ic t  is understand- 
able, but which shows that a t  a higher leve l  the conflict  i s  merely one 
aspect of r ea l i t y  and not the c r i t i c a l  aspect. The coafl ic t  i n  fact i s  
devoured by the higher leve l  Weltanschauung. 
in which he can observe the conflict, the observer also creates a convic- 
tion. It is a very common experience that is being portrayed here. 
mother sees her two young son6 quarreling over who should play w i t h  a toy; 
she changes their environment t o  the playground and the conflict  becomes ab- 
sorbed in to  a larger v i e w  of the world. 
right t o  have stopped the squabble; indeed the very stapping of it convinces 
her she is right. 
In the  act of creating a world 
The 
But also the mother knows she is 
How we can see the origin of the conviction i n  the thesis: it arose 
because the thesis was a larger view of some other conflict ,  and jus t  because 
it was a larger view it created the mood of conviction. 
feels more right than the person who can see tha t  an azgument is based on a 
narrow view of r e a l i t y  and that he holds a broader perspective. 
first time i n  our story, there i s  also a loss  of seriousness and the gain 
of 8 b i t  of humor in this episode of inquiry. 
jectively" views the conflict  runs the r isk of being si l ly,  of concocting 
a large but ridiculous world view. 
dispute may "see" that it is brou&t about by hidden forces from other 
planets, or an imperialist p lo t  of Wall Street, or a colllsnrnist plan of world 
domination. To be taken seriously, the bigger mind must somefrow get some- 
where %eyond" the opposition of convictions of the thesis and antithesis. 
What this "beyond" means is part  of Begel's master plan, which is an epic 
of the developnent of mind up t o  the stage of Absolute Mind. 
There is nobody who 
For the 
The "bigger" mind that "ob- 




mind goes "beyond" the confl ic t  when i t s  episode f i t s  in to  the larger epic. 
What later philosophy resents i s  the implicit assumption that we know the 
epic beforehand, and thus can force the  story of mind into a preconceived 
pattern. 
t i ve  mind we have been seeking i n  t h i s  chapter, and hence the  designer 
needs t o  know the method by which such a mind wrote Hegel's story. O f  
course, Hegel himself tr ied t o  say that the epic 's  story was inevitable, but 
even so he fails t o  t e l l  us how he knows this ,  or how he happened t o  come 
upon the correct form of the epic. In fac t ,  Hegel fa i ls  t o  sweep h is  own 
mind in to  the story, even though h i s  must be the most objective of a l l  if  
he i s  right. 
osophers we have discussed so far; none of them i s  able t o  use h i s  philo- 
sophy of design t o  account for  h i s  own mind's capability of designing. 
The mind that knows the whole epic must be the  supreme objec- 
Of course, similar remarks could be made about a l l  the phi l -  
The ''bigger" mind that observes the conflict  i s  often called the 
"synthesis," a term that only weakly describes the power Hegel intended t o  
ascribe t o  it. Possibly the dignity we normally perceive i n  the role  of a 
lega l  judge permits us t o  c a l l  this  bigger mind. a judging mind, and i ts  ac- 
t i v i t y  "judgment." 
unfolds. 
Other labels w i l l  occur t o  us as the subsequent argument 
Can we design judgment i n  the inquiring system? Again the expl ic i t  
design w i l l  threaten the l i f e  of the dialect ic  as it goes about i t s  task of 
being explicit .  The next chapter will explore the expl ic i t  design question 
i n  some detail. The general idea i s  t o  design the class  of models (Weltan- 
schauungen) i n  such a way that each m o d e l  can be expanded in to  a more general 
m o d e l ,  or else can be made  more refined by introducing f iner  distinctions. 
The straight-faced. inquiring system that has created a thesis  and an ant i -  
. 
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thes i s  i n  the manner described above now searches f o r  an expanded Weltan- 
schauung which, when conjoined with the data, makes both the thes i s  and the 
an t i t hes i s  maximally i r re levant  i n  the te leological  sense. 
important r e l a t ive  t o  the broader objectives of the inquirer.  
eously, the broader and/or deeper Weltanschauung maximizes the credence of 
the "super-proposal" or  synthesis. The inquirer can a l so  work on the data  
bank, e i the r  expanding it o r  making it more precise,  and search f o r  the 
optimal change i n  the data bank tha t  w i l l  maximize the irrelevance of the 
thesis and an t i t hes i s  and maximize t h e  credence in the synthesis. 
Neither i s  
Simultan- 
As we s h a l l  see, the en t i re  process leads t o  ever expanding and ever 
If the search process "converges" i n  some sense, then more refined models. 
the " l i m i t "  might be regarded 8 s  an objective description of r ea l i t y .  
it should be so regarded i s  not c lear  from Hegel's system alone, but the 
idea seems t o  be t h a t  an approach t o  r e a l i t y  based on the most forceful  ar- 
guments and counter-arguments at  each stage must in the end have eliminated 
every conceivable grounds f o r  doubt. 
every possible point of view--i.e., "objectively. " 
16. 
Why 
The world will have been examined from 
Crit ique of the Hegelian design. 
And yet there i s  much t o  make us question t h i s  design of an inquirer.  
We could--and will--ask why the process should lead anywhere but down blind 
and narruw a l leys ,  unless there is  a guide who has superior vis ion over the 
maze. 
perspective of the inquirer  i s  broad. 
by requiring t h a t  the expanded Weltanschauung of the "synthesis" be a d i f f e r -  
e n t  representation of r e a l i t y  i n  the sense of the last chapter, but even so, 
haw do we t e l l  whether the se t  of representations i s  free of bu i l t - i n  bias? 
The mere opposition of thesis  and an t i t hes i s  does not mean tha t  the 
This objection might be m e t  i n  pa r t  
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I - *  Wrt  there i s  a s t i l l  
Hegel's process of learning 
more serious c r i t i c i sm of an opposite kind: 
one's own m i n d  belongs t o  a le i sure  c lass ,  where 
t i m e  and cost  a re  of no concern. If i n  order t o  a t t a i n  an objective view- 
point one must search a l l  the ramifications of mind, then object ivi ty  i s  a 
cost ly  and time-consuming commodity; p a r t i a l  object ivi ty  might be far 
be t te r .  Indeed, i f  t i m e  and cost  are  relevant considerations, then a mind 
t h a t  does not go "all t h e  way," but instead properly balances the r i sks  of 
bias against  the costs  i s  more objective than the thoroughgoing but lavish 
mind. 
Consider, f o r  example, the p l i g h t  of the ordinary but extraordinarily 
curious c i t i zen  of today. 
business, he i s  cal led upon t o  vote on a plethora of issues of the world, the 
nation, the state and the c i ty .  If he i s  t o  be a w e l l  informed voter,  he 
must be "fully" informed about world poverty and internat ional  po l i t i c s ,  
national economics and regional development, c i t y  t r a f f i c  and educational 
planning, 
topics  w e l l .  The problem, then, i s  not "how does the public become w e l l  
informed?" but rather,"given so much time tha t  can be spent on any issue,  
what i s  the optimal display t h a t  can be presented t o  the c i t izen?"  I n  the 
Leibnizian inquirer,  the display consists of a stream of sentences (or 
char t s ) ,  some of which may be true,  others false, others irrelevant.  The 
c i t i zens '  problem i s  t o  put together several  consistent s to r i e s  and then, a s  
the data flow increases, t o  converge on one story tha t  seems t o  hold together 
in the best manner. The Lockean inquirer displays the "fundamental" data  
t h a t  a l l  experts agree are accurate and relevant,  and then builds a consis- 
t e n t  s tory out of these. The Kantian inquirer displays the same story from 
In addition t o  being w e l l  informed i n  h i s  own 
Y e t  one must spend a l i fe t ime t o  understand any one of these 
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different  points of view, emphasizing thereby t h a t  what i s  put i n t o  the 
s tory by the in t e rna l  mode of representation i s  not given from the outside. 
But the Hegelian inquirer,  using the same data,  t e l l s  two s to r i e s ,  one 
supporting the most prominent policy on one side, the other supporticg the 
most prominent policy on the  other side. The teleological  issue is :  which 
method of t e l l i n g  the s tory will produce the optimally informed c i t i zen  when 
each i s  constrained by the same cost and time resources? 
issue of the w e l l  informed public i s  t o  determine the optimal time and 
e f f o r t  t o  be put i n t o  the optimal mode of displaying information tn decision 
makers . 
The even broader 
W e  are far from finding any sa t i s fac tory  basis f o r  even discussing 
t h i s  very general problem of te leological  information. 
general as the problem of the whole system. 
mind i s  t o  break the problem down in to  manageable par t s ,  %.e., t o  c l a s s i fy  
i t s  many components and precisely define each par t .  
can then be put together, piece by piece, i n t o  a consistent framework. 
It i s  a problem as 
The incl inat ion of the thinking 
The s tory t h a t  unfolds 
Hegel's basic theme i s  anti-thinking i n  t h i s  sense: he challenges 
the designer t o  give up the  expl ic i t .  
f o r  the  log ica l  mind. 
episode, t e r r i b l y  excit ing,  carrying i t s  own commitment. But the "truth of 
the matter"is t h a t  the thes i s  i s  only one of a large set of a l te rna t ives  
t h a t  are "mapped" i n  some "decision making space." 
need be any more prominent than any other; how did the t h e s i s  come t o  be 
ca l l ed  out t o  play i t s  dominating ro l e?  And what process generates the an t i -  
t hes i s?  Why the sacred number two? Surely there could be three or more com- 
pe t ing  proposals, as there  are often three or more p o l i t i c a l  par t ies .  
Hegelian s tory- te l l ing i s  f rus t r a t ing  
Where does the thes i s  come from? It i s  a created 
No element of t h i s  space 
t 41 ~ i 
Finally, hardest t o  understand, i s  t h i s  mysterious synthesis,  the master 
observer-of-the-subject who stalks on stage unannounced. If w e  could have 
announced him beforehand--if w e  could have made the  conditions of h i s  entry 
explicit--we could have saved a l l  the Sother of the tragi-comedy of the 
thesis and an t i thes i s .  Indeed, once we become exp l i c i t  about t h i s  master 
observer, the squabble between the lowlier commitments i s  ridiculous,  
f r ivolous,  a t  best sadly humorous. 
not e x i s t  without the pr ior  confl ic t :  
17. The story t e l l i n g  i n q i t r e r .  
Y e t  Hegel t e l l s  us the synthesis does 
ideas are generated out of opposition. 
The Hegelian inquirer i s  a story teller,  and Hegel's thesis  i s  t h a t  
the  best inquiry i s  the inquiry tha t  produces s tor ies .  The underlying l i f e  
of a s tory i s  i t s  drama, not i t s  "accuracy." Drama has the  log ica l  charac- 
t e r i s t i c  of a flow of events i n  which each subsequent event p a r t i a l l y  con- 
t r a d i c t s  what went before; there i s  nothing dul le r  than a thoroughly con- 
s i s t e n t  story. Drama i s  the interplay of the  t rag ic  and the  comic; i t s  
blood i s  conviction, and i t s  blood pressure i s  antagonism. , It prohibi ts  
steri le c lass i f ica t ion .  
only t o  emphasize the implicit .  
It i s  above a l l  implici t ;  it uses  the exp l i c i t  
But i s  s tory t e l l i n g  science? Does a system designed t o  t e l l  s to r i e s  
O r  i s  the w e l l  also produce knowledge? 
s to ry  te l ler  ever a "system"? 
O r  can such a system be "designed"? 
We would give up en t i r e ly  too much i f  we now gave up the exp l i c i t  as 
a c r i t e r i o n  of design. 
a l l  that drama i s  essent ia l ly  implicit ,  or t h a t  objective story t e l l i n g  
cannot be exp l i c i t l y  designed. 
There i s  no reason as yet t o  declare once and f o r  
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We should note i n  closing tha t  most uncr i t ica l  aspect of Hegel's 
story t e l l i n g  which f lavors  h i s  whole theory of mind, namely that  the s tory 
has some point t o  it. The point i n  Hegel's case was the creation by the 
process of an Absolute Mind. The point i s  a l so  represented i n  t h a t  greatest  
e h  the  nineteenth century in te l lec tua l  developed: progress. Progress i s  
the  s tory of mankind; men will push back s tep by step the domain of the un- 
known, ever reducing the uncertain decimal place t o  a cer ta inty,  ever rubbing 
out ignorance and supersti t ion.  Men w i l l  gradually increase the greatest  
gco i  of the greatest number, eiiminate poverty, drudgery, disease, un- 
happiness. 
There must be a way t o  make exp l i c i t  the progress t h a t  underlies the 
Hegelian story of mind. And indeed, the way seems already a t  hand i n  the 
i n f i n i t e  regress of observing minds. I n  the words of E. A. Singer: 
Suppose one were to maintain t h a t  the method of distinguishing 
between the 'appearances' and 'that which appears' w a s  one t h a t  
defined and made attainable a 'real' f o r  every 'appearing,' only 
that  t h i s  'real' w a s  no less an 'appearing' pointed t o  a 'more 
real' and so on i n  infinitum. 
progress, and i f 7 n e  defines the goal of t h i s  progress as an 
' ideal '  it i s  none the l e s s  t rue  t h a t  only a progress can define 
a real ideal.  
one can be interested.  "1 
Here i s  no longer a c i r c l e  but a 
And it i s  only i n  the poss ib i l i ty  of progress tha t  
1 
E. A. Singer, Mind as Behavior, p. 282, R. G. Adams & Co., 1924. A 
c 
APPENDIX 
A Sketch of an Explicit Begelian Inquiring System 
L e t z b e  a s e t  of "data," dl, d2, * * * ,  5' 
Let W- be a set of models (Weltanschauungen), W1, W2, . . . ,W4 . 
L e t  @ be an operator conjoining an element of with an element 
and every WJ i n  W- there ex i s t s  one of J, such tha t  f o r  every d i n  
and only one element of a set 2. 
f o r  a given W onto a s e t  J- i n  a many-one correspondence (there may be 
several  pa i r s  that map onto the same element ofJ). 
the "information se t"  of a given W and the operator @ i s  cal led the in- 
te rpre ta t ive  operator. Thus f o r  each element ofK there corresponds an 
information se t ,  represented by J- (W). 
i 
In other words, X maps elements o f 2  
The s e t  is called 
-- T i s  a set of "theses," i.e., non-analytic sentences s t a t ing  some- 
thing about the world, such tha t  no element of T implies or  i s  implied by 
any element of 2 , &, or I. 
..cy- 
C i s  a two-place function tha t  transforms and any & (W) i n to  
C i s  the "degree of credence" i n  3 elements of the real number system. 
given the information contained in (W). Hence f o r  each I (W) there w i l l  
correspond a credence measure f o r  T: This represents the  
credence of a thesis given that the world i s  accurately described by W. 
uv 





The maximal element of W r e l a t ive  t o  a thesis A of T i s  that  - - m*s 
WoA which maximizes the credence of A over a l l  elements of D; i .e.,  
The an t i thes i s ,  B, i s  811 element of T which can be given maximal 
u 
credence i n  terms of some world view and the set of data. Thus the 
an t i t hes i s  i s  that To of T satisfying 
for a l l  Tk f A. 
I n  the case of t he  synthesis, we introduce an operator which "expands" 
onto a new set J'. each world view, i.e., maps 
operator that  maps 2 i n t o  an "expanded" data set, zl ,  and T in to  an ex- 
panded s e t  of proposals TI. The synthesis i s  that element of T' whose 
maximizing W of W t  minimizes the credence i n  both the thesis and the 
an t i thes i s .  
Similarly, we need an 
- 
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